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COMMENTS 
PROSECUTE THE CHEERLEADER, SAVE THE 
WORLD?:  ASSERTING FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY CRIMES COMMITTED 
THROUGH “SEXTING”  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps one of the most quoted lines from NBC’s popular tele-
vision show Heroes is “Save the cheerleader, save the world,” the 
prophetic message of the time-traveling Hiro Nakumura given to 
the young idealist Peter Petrelli.1 However, one can imagine that 
the scene may have played out very differently if Peter were not a 
modern-day super hero, but instead a federal prosecutor. Hiro 
walks into Peter’s office and pronounces, “Peter Petrelli, prose-
cute the cheerleader, save the world!” Peter, startled by Hiro’s 
prophecy, looks up from his desk and asks, “Why Hiro?” Hiro 
glances down with his characteristic grimace, raises a plastic evi-
dence bag containing a cell phone, and replies, “She has been 
sexting!”  
This comment explores the possible scenarios in which sexting 
could give rise to prosecution under Protection of Children 
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 (“PCASEA”) for trans-
porting, distributing, receiving, or possessing child pornography.2 
Part II provides background information on the practice and pre-
valence of sexting. Part III discusses the definition of child porno-
graphy within the meaning of federal law and applies that defini-
1. Heroes: Save the Cheerleader (NBC television broadcast Oct. 23, 2006).
2. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act (“PCASEA”) of 1977, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2251–52, 2256 (Supp. II 2008). The specific statutory provisions within the 
PCASEA that criminalize transporting, distributing, receiving, or possessing child porno-
graphy are codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (Supp. II 2008).  
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tion to sexting. Part IV presents the concept of the transporting 
or shipping in interstate or foreign commerce jurisdictional hook 
and its potential relation to sexting. Part V applies the principles 
of statutory interpretation to the relevant provisions of the 
PCASEA to determine the proper application of the statute’s cur-
rent jurisdictional language. Part VI discusses the application of 
sexting to the particular offenses of transporting, distributing, re-
ceiving, or possessing child pornography under the PCASEA, in-
cluding distinct jurisdictional issues for each offense.3 Part VII 
delineates issues that are collateral to the jurisdictional question, 
but that are necessarily raised by attempting to resolve it. Part 
VIII concludes that prosecution of child pornography offenses 
committed through sexting is within the purview of the PCASEA 
and future judicial interpretations of the PCASEA will result in 
broad subject matter jurisdiction to do so.  
II. BACKGROUND
Sexting has been defined as “[t]he practice of sending or post-
ing sexually suggestive text messages and images, including nude 
or semi-nude photographs, via cellular telephones . . . or over the 
Internet. . . .”4 Typically, the subject takes a picture of himself or 
herself with a mobile phone camera (or other digital camera), or 
has someone else take the picture.5 The picture is then stored as a 
digital image and transmitted via mobile phone as a text-
message, photo-send function, or electronic mail.6 Additionally, 
the subject may use a mobile phone to post the image to a social 
networking website like Facebook or MySpace.7 There are three 
basic scenarios in which teenagers engage in sexting: (1) images 
are shared between two romantic partners in lieu of, as a prelude 
to, or as part of sexual activity; (2) the recipient of a text message 
that was sent in the course of a romantic relationship forwards 
3. It is important to note that § 2252 is not the only potential statute under which
sexting could be prosecuted. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (2006) (restricting production and 
transportation of obscene matters for sale or distribution); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252A (2006 
& Supp. II 2008) (restricting child exploitation); 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006) (criminalizing, ob-
scene phone calls). Nonetheless, the issues that arise in determining jurisdiction under § 
2252 are likely to be present in these other statutes. 
4. Complaint ¶ 7, Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (No.
3:09-cv-540).  
5. Id. ¶ 8.
6. Id. ¶ 9.
7. Id.
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the image to friends, classmates, or other individuals; and (3) im-
ages are exchanged between friends platonically or with the hope 
of cultivating a romantic relationship.8  
There is no doubt that sexting among teenagers is a growing 
problem that federal lawmakers will be forced to confront in the 
near future.9 Seventy-one percent of teenagers between the ages 
of twelve and seventeen own a mobile phone.10 When considered 
in their respective age categories, the percentage of teenagers 
owning a mobile phone increases with age: 52% between the ages 
of twelve and thirteen, 72% at the age of fourteen, and 84% at the 
age of seventeen.11 Next, turning to the use of mobile phones: 58% 
of all teenagers have sent text messages to friends,12 and 38% do 
so on a daily basis.13 
Within the population of teenagers that own mobile phones, 
four percent have sent sexually suggestive nude or nearly nude 
images of themselves via text message.14 Eight percent of seven-
teen-year-olds that own a mobile phone have sent sexually sug-
gestive nude or nearly nude images of themselves via text mes-
sage.15 Fifteen percent of teenagers who own a mobile phone have 
received sexually suggestive nude or nearly nude images of some-
one they know via text message.16 Thirty percent of seventeen-
year-olds that own a mobile phone have received sexually sugges-
tive nude, or nearly nude images via text message.17 Given the 
strong presence of sexting in the teenage population and its ex-
pected growth in the future, it is necessary to consider how feder-
al law is currently geared to address the issue.18 
8. AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, TEENS AND SEXTING 6–7
(2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2009/PIP_Teens_and_Sexting. 
pdf.   
9. For the purposes of the statistical evidence presented in Part II, a teenager is a
child between the age of twelve and seventeen. Id. at 2. 
10. AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, TEENS AND SOCIAL 
MEDIA: AN OVERVIEW 17 (2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/presentations/2009/17-Teens-
And-Social-Media-An-Overview.aspx (follow “Download Powerpoint” hyperlink). 
11. Id.
12. Id. at 9.
13. Id. at 10.
14. LENHART, supra note 8, at 2.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Anayat Durrani, ‘‘Sexting’’ Growing Trend Among Teens, GETLEGAL, Apr. 29,
2009, http://public.getlegal.com/articles/sexting (“Teens sending risqué photos of them-
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III. DEFINING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Before considering the jurisdictional question, it is worth dis-
cussing an equally important threshold issue under the PCASEA. 
Namely, one must determine whether the image or images in 
question are of the variety proscribed by the PCASEA, because 
not every text message containing nude or partially nude teenag-
ers is child pornography for the purposes of federal law.19 Section 
2256(8) provides, in relevant part, that child pornography is any 
visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct when the visual de-
piction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated 
image of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.20 Sexually 
explicit conduct includes (1) all forms of sexual intercourse (in-
cluding oral or anal) where the genitals, breasts, or pubic area of 
any person is exhibited; (2) bestiality; (3) masturbation; (4) sadis-
tic or masochistic abuse; and (5) the lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area.21 
There is a tremendous amount of leeway for creative argument 
in § 2256’s definition of sexually explicit conduct, particularly in 
an image purporting to be a “lascivious exhibition of the genitals 
or pubic area.”22 For example, an image of a nude minor may not 
be child pornography because the display of the genital or pubic 
area is not lascivious.23 Furthermore, an image depicting a mi-
 
selves to friends using cell phones, called ‘sexting,’ has parents and school officials up in 
arms over the growing trend.”). 
19. See, e.g., Doe v. Chamberlin, 299 F.3d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that nude
photographs of minors, taken in a shower on a beach, were not lascivious because photos 
depicted natural activity of washing off sand, pubic areas of minors were not focal, shower 
was not a place associated with sexual activity, and minors did not display any sexual 
coyness).  
20. This is a paraphrase of the definition provided in § 2256(8)(B) (Supp. II 2008). For
purposes of this statute, a minor is an individual under the age of eighteen. Id. § 2256(1). 
The statute outlines other situations where certain material will be considered child por-
nography. Id. § 2256(8)(A)–(C). However, those provisions are not relevant to the scope of 
this comment. It is worth noting that § 2256(8)(B) was declared unconstitutional at one 
point. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002). Congress amended § 
2256(8)(B) in response to Ashcroft. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the 
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 501–02, 117 Stat. 650, 
676–78 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2006)).    
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)–(B) (Supp. II 2008).
22. Id. § 2256(2)(B)(iii).
23. See, e.g., Chamberlin, 299 F.3d at 196. The criteria used in determining whether
an exhibition of a minor’s genitalia or pubic area is lascivious include (1) “whether a for-
bidden area is the focus” of the image, (2) “whether the setting of the depiction is sexually 
suggestive or generally associated with sexual activity,” (3) “whether the pose or attire of 
the minor is unnatural or inappropriate given her age,” (4) “whether the child is naked,” 
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nor’s breasts alone may not qualify, even if the image is sexually 
suggestive.24 However, nudity or discernability are not prerequi-
sites for the occurrence of a lascivious exhibition within the 
meaning of § 2256.25 Thus, a court may find that images of minors 
who are wearing thin or opaque clothing over the proscribed 
areas are still child pornography within the meaning of the 
PCASEA.26 Therefore, a party (whether the government or the de-
fendant) will first want to determine whether a colorable argu-
ment may be made regarding the image’s status as child porno-
graphy before expending significant resources on accumulating 
evidence that addresses the elements of a particular offense.  
IV. THE COMMON “JURISDICTIONAL HOOK”
A.  Defining a Jurisdictional Hook 
If a legitimate argument can be made that the image in ques-
tion is child pornography, the next critical inquiry is whether the 
facts of the case are sufficient to prove a “jurisdictional hook” un-
der the language of the PCASEA. A jurisdictional hook is “a pro-
vision in a federal statute that requires the government to estab-
lish specific facts justifying the exercise of federal jurisdiction in 
connection with any individual application of the statute.”27 The 
purpose of the jurisdictional hook is to create the necessary nexus 
between the proscribed conduct and interstate commerce so that 
federal prosecution complies with the Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution.28  
(5) “whether the child shows sexual coyness or willingness to engage in sex,” and (6) 
“whether the photo is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.” Id. 
(citing United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986)). However, “[this] list 
is not exhaustive and no single factor is dispositive.” Id. (citing United States v. Knox, 32 
F.3d 733, 746 n.10 (3d Cir. 1994)).  
24. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton, 257 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2001).
25. Knox, 32 F.3d at 746.
26. Id. at 747 (finding a “lascivious exhibition” when minor subjects, wearing only
“very tight leotards, panties, or bathing suits,” were video-taped “spreading or extending 
their legs to make their genital and pubic region entirely visible to the viewer”). 
27. United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Tara M. Stuckey,
Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpreting Federal Regulations of 
Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2101, 2105–06 (2006) (explaining the defini-
tion and purpose of a jurisdictional hook).  
28. United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611–12 (2000); Rodia, 194 F.3d at 471).  As noted above, this
comment’s primary purpose is to focus on the jurisdictional dimension of this legal issue, 
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The goal of this comment is to identify when sexting will trig-
ger federal jurisdiction under the PCASEA, allowing prosecution 
of an individual for transporting, distributing, receiving, or pos-
sessing child pornography.29 While the factual circumstances that 
give rise to charging a specific offense are different, there is a fac-
tual scenario that will confer federal jurisdiction to prosecute any 
of the above named offenses—if the child pornography in question 
has been transported or shipped in interstate or foreign com-
merce.30 If such a scenario exists, the government will be able to 
prove the necessary jurisdictional hook for any of the offenses 
enumerated in § 2252(a).31 Therefore, regardless of the offense 
charged, a central issue for sexting child pornography cases is 
whether sending child pornography via text message is tanta-
mount to sending it in interstate or foreign commerce. Does it 
matter where the sender and recipient are located? Is the tech-
nological nature of mobile phone communications relevant? An-
swers to these questions, and others like them, may mean the dif-
 
not the constitutional aspects. Nonetheless, there is great potential for confusing the issue 
of jurisdiction with the issue of Congress’s constitutional power to regulate intrastate child 
pornography operations. Therefore, a brief discussion of the constitutional aspect of the 
issue is warranted. It is critical to keep the constitutional dimension of regulating intras-
tate trafficking of child pornography analytically distinct from the issue of the jurisdic-
tional hook because satisfying the constitutional requirement does not automatically satis-
fy the jurisdictional requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 259 F. App’x 171, 173 
n.1 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1200 n.7 (10th Cir. 2007). 
In other words, current precedent suggests that it is a constitutionally permissible use of 
the Commerce Clause for the federal government to prosecute an individual for intrastate 
child pornography operations. See Rodia, 194 F.3d at 476; United States v. Bausch, 140 
F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 1998). 
Thus, a defendant appealing a conviction for intrastate trafficking of child pornography on 
the grounds that a statute regulating intrastate child pornography operations is an un-
constitutional use of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is likely to fail. See, 
e.g., Rodia, 194 F.3d at 478–79. However, the charge may still be dismissed or reversed 
because the “interstate commerce” jurisdictional hook that is required by the statutory 
language of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 is lacking. See, e.g., Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1207. While there 
is no debate that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate purely 
interstate child pornography enterprises and it manifested its intent to use the full extent 
of its power in recent amendments to the statute, it is unclear if the language of § 2522, as 
it existed prior to these amendments, limited its ability to do so. See id. at 1201–02; Pub. 
L. 110-358, 122 Stat. 4001, 4002–03 (2008) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252 
(Supp. II. 2008)). It could be argued that the limited jurisdictional language in the prior 
version of § 2252(a) demonstrated that Congress did not originally intend to regulate child 
pornography operations to the fullest extent permitted by the Constitution. See Schaefer, 
501 F.3d at 1201–02.     
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)–(4) (Supp. II 2008).
30. Id. However, it is important to note that other jurisdictional hooks have been as-
signed to particular offenses. These are discussed below. See discussion infra Part V. 
31. See id.
2010] PROSECUTE THE CHEERLEADER 1333 
ference in the outcome of the action because jurisdiction cannot 
be conferred on the court by the will or waiver of the parties.32 If 
subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, the court is required to 
dismiss the suit without regard to its procedural posture.33 The 
issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any point by the parties or 
by the court sua sponte.34 In evaluating whether sending child 
pornography via text message satisfies the in interstate or foreign 
commerce jurisdictional hook, two approaches are possible: (1) the 
per se approach and (2) the interstate movement approach.35  
B.  The Per Se Approach to the Jurisdictional Hook  
Courts may treat the transmission of a text message as they 
have treated other electronic transmissions, particularly trans-
missions over the Internet. Typically, when child pornography 
has been sent through the Internet, most courts have automati-
cally found the jurisdictional hook to be sufficiently proved.36 For 
the purposes of this comment, this will be called the “per se” ap-
proach. Courts justify the per se approach by averring that 
transmitting material through the Internet (a metaphysical net-
32. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 692 (1986) (“[F]ederal courts . . . exer-
cise only the authority conferred on them by Art. III and by congressional enactments pur-
suant thereto.”). Even a nonconditional guilty plea does not waive the ability to appeal ju-
risdictional defects. See, e.g., Green, 259 F. App’x at 173 n.1.  
33. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999).
34. United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 227 F.3d 476, 482 n.11 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Barnes v. Levitt, 118 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 1997)); United States v. Means, 133 F.3d 444, 
448 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d 571, 574 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
35. As will be discussed later in this comment, recent amendments to § 2252(a) make
clear the interstate movement approach is not the proper interpretation of the statute. See 
discussion infra Part VI. Nonetheless, understanding the nature of these two approaches 
is relevant, as a defendant may be tried under the law as it existed before these amend-
ments took place. See, e.g., United States v. Beltran-Hernandez, No. CR 08-0726 WHA, 
2009 WL 928169, at *1 & n.1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009). 
36. See United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2006) (adopting a mode
of analysis, under § 2252A, that considers the defendant’s use of the Internet in conduct-
ing child pornography operations to automatically establish the requisite “interstate com-
merce” jurisdictional hook); United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(finding transmission of photographs via the Internet is “tantamount to” moving them 
through interstate commerce for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. 
Supp. 824, 830–38 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (discussing the global nature and size of the Internet). 
But see United States v. Schaffer, 501 F.3d at 1197–1205 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that § 
2252(a) confers federal jurisdiction only when the government proves the signal or trans-
mission carrying the proscribed material traveled between state boundaries). 
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work of information by its very nature) inherently places the ma-
terial in the stream of interstate or foreign commerce.37 Further-
more, cyberspace has no particular geographic location.38 The In-
ternet is the international network of computers that allows 
information in cyberspace to be available anywhere in the world.39 
One court provided an unequivocal expression of the per se ap-
proach, concluding “that an electronic transmission of [child por-
nography], whether across state lines or across the street, via the 
internet is a means of transmission in interstate commerce.”40  
In the context of sexting, a court applying the per se approach 
would hold that any text message transmitted by use of a tele-
communications device has been sent in interstate or foreign 
commerce, regardless of the geographic location of the sender and 
recipient.41 United States v. Giordano provides an excellent exam-
ple of the reasoning and application of the per se approach to tel-
ecommunications devices, albeit applying a different statute.42 
Giordano involved the defendant’s appeal of (1) one conviction of 
conspiring to transmit the names of two minor victims through a 
means or facility of interstate commerce with the intent to entice, 
encourage, offer, and solicit criminal sexual activity; and (2) four-
teen convictions of actually transmitting the names of the two 
victims with the intent to entice, encourage, offer, and solicit 
criminal sexual activity.43 The government accumulated its evi-
dence for the basis of the charges by intercepting 151 calls on 
Giordano’s mobile phone, to and from a female prostitute, in 
which she agreed (at his behest) to bring minor children to ob-
serve or participate in purchased sexual services.44  
37. United States v. Murray, 52 M.J. 423, 426 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Car-
roll, 105 F.3d at 742; Reno, 929 F. Supp at 830–38). 
38. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997).
39. Id.
40. United States v. Smith, 47 M.J. 588, 592 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1997).
41. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641, 644 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[I]ntrastate use of the tele-
phone may confer federal jurisdiction over a private action alleging violation of § 10 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and S.E.C. Rule 10b-5.”).  
42. 442 F.3d 30, 39–41 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying the per se approach and finding that
an intrastate telephone call could confer federal jurisdiction for prosecution under § 2425 
(2006)). 
43. Id. at 33. The defendant also appealed other convictions that are not relevant to
this discussion. See id.  
44. Id.
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On appeal, Giordano categorized the phone calls giving rise to 
the charges as intrastate because both he and the prostitute had 
been in the same state when the calls took place.45 Accordingly, he 
argued that the calls were an insufficient jurisdictional hook un-
der the relevant federal law because they were not made using a 
means or facility of interstate commerce.46 In analyzing the issue, 
the court focused on the technological nature of a telecommunica-
tion network.47 It noted that a telephone network, by nature of its 
national presence and ability to power interstate communication, 
is a means or facility of interstate commerce.48 The court then ca-
tegorized an intrastate phone call as a particularized use of that 
means or facility and concluded that the intrastate use of a 
means or facility of interstate commerce satisfies the jurisdiction-
al language provided in § 2425.49 Thus, under the per se approach, 
the “in interstate or foreign commerce” jurisdictional hook is sa-
tisfied if the transmission method—in this case, a mobile phone 
network—has a national or international presence, or an ability 
to power interstate or international communication.50 If so, a 
transmission via that method is, by definition, one made in a 
means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce regardless of 
the origin and destination of the transmission.51  
Thus, an advocate of broader jurisdictional ability to prosecute 
sexting under the PCASEA should focus on tendering evidence of 
the technological nature of a mobile phone network, particularly 
its nationwide scope. Once a showing of the national presence and 
capability of the phone network is made, the argument then 
would follow that any transmission through it—intrastate or in-
terstate in nature—is a per se satisfaction of the jurisdictional 
hook.52 Given the similarity of language and the substantive pur-
45. Id. at 38.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 39 (citing United States v. Perez, 414 F.3d 302, 304 (2d Cir. 2005)).
48. Id. (citing Perez, 414 F.3d at 304).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 39–40.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Section
1958 establishes federal jurisdiction whenever any ‘facility of interstate commerce’ is used 
in the commission of a murder-for-hire offense, regardless of whether the use is interstate 
in nature (i.e. the telephone call was between states) or purely intrastate in nature (i.e. the 
telephone call was made to another telephone within the same state).”).  
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pose between § 2425—the statute used in the Giordorno case—
and the PCASEA, courts may find this argument persuasive. 
C.  The Interstate Movement Approach to the Jurisdictional Hook  
The propriety of applying the per se approach to child porno-
graphy offenses committed through sexting is undermined by two 
factors: (1) application of the per se approach ignores the technol-
ogical nature of the particular mobile phone communication that 
is the subject matter of the action, and (2) statutory and judicial 
authority indicates that the technological nature of mobile phone 
communications is relevant for the purposes of conferring juris-
diction for prosecution of the relevant offenses under the 
PCASEA. For the purposes of this comment, the alternative to 
the per se approach will be termed the “interstate movement” ap-
proach. Under this approach, it is not the phone network’s na-
tional presence or ability to power interstate communication that 
satisfies the jurisdictional hook. Rather, an electronic transmis-
sion is evaluated in the same manner as a physical transmission, 
with the jurisdictional inquiry being the specific path that the 
proscribed image traveled en route to its destination.53  
Conceptually, sending a text message via mobile phone bears a 
strong semblance to mailing a letter.54 Like a mailed letter, the 
text message is relayed from one specific point to another, until 
arriving at its final destination.55 When an individual sends a 
short message service (“SMS”) text message, the communication 
signal is transmitted to a relay tower.56 The tower then forwards 
the signal to an SMS center.57 The center selects a tower or series 
of towers that can then relay the signal to the intended recipient, 
and transmits the signal accordingly.58 The signal passes through 
the towers and arrives at the intended destination.59 One website 
53. See, e.g., United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2007).
54. Short message service (“SMS”) technology is what allows an individual to send a
text message (up to 160 characters). Jennifer Maughan, How Does Text Messaging Work?, 
LIFE 123, http://www.life123.com/technology/home-electronics/text-messaging/how-does-te 
xt-messaging-work.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).  
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Tiesha Whatley, How Does Text Messaging Work?, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/
how-does_4571898_text-messaging-work.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
58. Id.
59. Id.
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provides a simplified explanation of the SMS communication 
process:  
Cell phones are always sending and receiving information through 
signals even when the phone isn’t in use. The signals are sent and 
received from a cell phone tower or control channel. In order for the 
phone calls and messages to come through, the control channel needs 
to know which phone belongs to which phone number. Depending on 
the location of the cell phone, it will communicate with different 
towers as the user moves around the city, state, country and even 
the world. If the phone is unable to communicate with a tower, then 
it will not receive a signal and can’t be used.  
The control channel maps the path for SMS, or text messages. When 
a message is sent, it first must go through the nearby tower and 
then the SMS center. The SMSC receives the message and sends it 
to the appropriate tower closest to the location of the cell phone and 
then to the destination.60 
Thus, a text message signal—like a letter sent in the mail—
traverses an identifiable path between sender and recipient. This 
being true, it is conceivable that the text message signal carrying 
child pornography from one mobile phone to another would never 
leave a state’s territorial boundaries if the parties, relevant tow-
ers, and SMS center were all within the same state. 
Why is the travel path of the signal relevant? First, the plain 
language of “transports or ships . . . in . . . interstate or foreign 
commerce” suggests the proscribed image must actually travel 
between state boundaries.61 Second, precedent suggests that par-
ticular jurisdictional language should be interpreted in accord 
with the interstate movement approach.62  
Section 2252(a)(1)–(2), (4) each refer to shipping or transport-
ing the proscribed image “in” interstate or foreign commerce.63 
Giving this language its plain meaning, it suggests a jurisdiction-
al requirement that the child pornography must actually move 
between state boundaries.64 Assigning that interpretation to the 
statutory language of § 2252(a)(1) is consistent with how other 
60. Id.
61. See Bradley Scott Shannon, The Jurisdictional Limits of Federal Criminal Child
Pornography Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 73, 88 (1999) (noting the language of the statute 
suggests the jurisdictional requirement is met only if the pornography moves across state 
boundaries).  
62. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1202–04 (10th Cir. 2007).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)–(2), (4) (Supp. II 2008).
64. Id.; Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1201–02 (citing United States v. Hunt, 456 F.3d 1255,
1264–65 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
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statutes possessing similar language have been interpreted.65 At 
least one court has expressly concluded that “the plain terms of § 
2252(a) convey that Congress intended to punish only those who 
moved images or ‘materials’ across state lines . . . .”66 
There is judicial support for such an interpretation. At least 
one court interpreting § 2252(a) found an absolute jurisdictional 
requisite in the statute that the child pornography must have 
moved between state boundaries.67 In United States v. Schaefer, 
the Tenth Circuit rejected the per se approach, even in transmis-
sion of pornography through the Internet, stating, “[§ 2252(a)’s] 
‘including by computer’ [language] specifies a method of inter-
state movement; the government must still establish that any 
computer-related movement crossed state lines.”68 The court de-
clined to hold that there is an “Internet exception” to the jurisdic-
tional requisite that the images or material cross state lines, and 
reaffirmed that the government must prove interstate movement 
by presenting sufficient evidence to that effect.69 Oddly enough, 
even the court in Giordano, though applying the per se approach, 
arguably acknowledged that the travel path of the communication 
signals are the proper consideration in determining if the juris-
dictional requirement is met.70 
In the context of sexting, a court applying the interstate 
movement approach to text messaging communication would base 
its jurisdictional analysis on the specific route that the SMS sig-
nal traveled, finding jurisdiction only where the signal carrying 
65. Id. at 1202 (citing United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 674–75 (10th Cir. 1989)
(noting that the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, has similar language and has been 
consistently interpreted to require communications to cross state lines)). 
66. Id.
67. Id. However, it is important to note that the Schaefer court arrived at this conclu-
sion relaying on the statutory language of § 2252(a) as it existed prior to the Effective 
Child Pornography Prosecution Act (ECPPA) of 2007, Pub. L. 110-358, 122 Stat. 4001 
(2008) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-52 (Supp. II 2008)). 
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1205.
70. United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 30, 39 n.8 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing that the
defendant did not raise the issue of whether the particular communication signals tra-
veled in an intrastate fashion).  
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the child pornography traveled across state borders.71 United 
States v. Drury is illustrative of how a court using the interstate 
movement approach would determine if the “transported or 
shipped in interstate or foreign commerce” jurisdictional hook 
under § 2252(a)(1)–(4) has been satisfied.72 In Drury, the court 
addressed the issue of whether the defendant used a facility “in 
interstate or foreign commerce” with the intent to commit murder 
when he called an undercover agent (believing him to be a merce-
nary) for the purpose of having his wife assassinated.73 Drury 
called the agent’s mobile phone four times from a payphone in 
Georgia, each time with the purpose of procuring mercenary ser-
vices.74 The agent received each of the calls while also being phys-
ically present in Georgia.75 On appeal from his conviction, Drury 
argued that the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 1958 mandated 
reading the jurisdictional element in accord with the interstate 
movement approach.76 The government argued that Drury’s use of 
a payphone constituted the use of a facility that, based on its in-
terstate capabilities rather than actual interstate use, qualified 
inherently as a “facility in interstate commerce.”77 Without decid-
ing which approach to adopt, the court noted that the routing of 
the telephone calls caused the communication signal to travel 
outside of Georgia before the agent received them.78 Accordingly, 
even if the interstate movement approach did apply, the jurisdic-
tional prong had been satisfied when the signal traveled from 
Georgia to Florida, and back to Georgia.79  
Thus, an advocate of narrow jurisdictional ability to prosecute 
teenagers for sexting under the PCASEA should argue that the 
burden is on the government to prove that the images of child 
pornography traveled between state boundaries. The argument 
71. See, e.g., Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1205 (rejecting the per se approach for any elec-
tronic transmission and holding that § 2252(a) confers federal jurisdiction only when gov-
ernment proves the signal or transmission carrying the proscribed material traveled be-
tween state boundaries).  
72. 396 F.3d 1303, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2005).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1307.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1312. However, Drury argued that the interstate movement of the commu-
nication signal must actually be intentional under the statute. Id. The court did not find 
this argument persuasive. Id. 
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1313.
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would assert that, in the absence of sufficient evidence showing 
the SMS signal traveled an interstate route, the court lacks juris-
diction, and the action must be dismissed or the conviction re-
versed.80 
V.  THE PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Recent amendments to the PCASEA have staggering implica-
tions for the future prosecution of sexting cases.81 In evaluating 
whether the per se approach or the interstate movement ap-
proach is the appropriate framework for deciding the question of 
jurisdiction, it is helpful to turn to the principles of statutory in-
terpretation.82 When § 2252(a) is meticulously dissected with 
these principles in mind, an analysis of the current statutory lan-
guage indicates that the per se approach should be applied in all 
sexting cases, regardless of whether the charged offense is trans-
portation of child pornography in violation of § 2252(a)(1), receiv-
ing or distributing child pornography in violation of § 2252(a)(2), 
or possession of child pornography in violation of § 2252(a)(4). 
Several principles of statutory interpretation are helpful in re-
solving whether Congress intended for courts to use the per se 
approach or the interstate movement approach when interpreting 
the jurisdictional language of § 2252(a). When attempting to give 
meaning to the terms of a statute, courts “‘must interpret sta-
tutes as a whole, giving effect to each word and making every ef-
fort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other 
provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or super-
fluous.’”83 The plain meaning of a statute controls unless a literal 
application of the statutory language will produce a result de-
monstrably at odds with the intent of the drafters, or if the lan-
guage itself is ambiguous.84 Different terms within a statute are 
80. See, e.g., United States v. Beltran-Hernandez, No. CR 08-0726 WHA, 2009 WL
928169, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) (discussing defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ba-
sis that the prosecution could not adduce evidence in accordance with the interstate 
movement approach).  
81. ECPPA, Pub. L. 110-358, 122 Stat. 4001, 4002–03 (2008) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–52 (Supp. II 2008)). 
82. United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 946 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that the
principles of statutory interpretation are used to discern congressional intent). 
83. Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 825 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lake Cumber-
land Trust, Inc. v. EPA, 954 F.2d 1218, 1222 (6th Cir. 1992)) (emphasis added). 
84. Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting
United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313, 1317 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
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presumed to have different meanings.85 “[I]dentical words used in 
different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to 
have the same meaning.”86 To understand why the principles of 
statutory interpretation support the application of the per se ap-
proach, it is necessary to briefly apply them to the relevant provi-
sions of § 2252(a). 
Section 2252(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that any person 
who “knowingly transports or ships [child pornography] using 
any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or af-
fecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means” is in viola-
tion of federal law.87 In interpreting prior versions of this provi-
sion, courts found it contained a single jurisdictional hook 
proscribing the transport of child pornography in interstate or 
foreign commerce.88 However, if each word in the current provi-
sion is given meaning and the different terms within the provi-
sion are presumed to have different meanings,89 § 2252(a)(1) 
should be read as currently containing three distinct jurisdiction-
al hooks. Section 2252(a)(1) proscribes transporting or shipping 
child pornography (1) “using any means or facility of interstate or 
foreign commerce,” (2) “in . . . interstate or foreign commerce,” or 
(3) in a manner “affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”90 
Section 2252(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, that it is unlawful 
to receive or distribute child pornography “using any means or fa-
cility of interstate or foreign commerce or that has been mailed, 
or has been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or 
foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have been 
mailed or so shipped or transported . . . .”91 Courts interpreting 
prior versions of the statute read this provision as containing a 
“shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce” juris-
dictional hook and a “materials which have been mailed or so 
85. States Roofing Corp. v. Winter, 587 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing United
States v. Maria, 186 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
86. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008) (emphasis added).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Gallardo, No. 94-50125, 1995 WL 71025, at *1 (5th Cir.
Jan. 24, 1995); Montiel Garcia v. United States, 987 F.2d 153, 154 (2d Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Pabon-Cruz, 255 F. Supp. 2d 200, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
89. See Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 825 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lake Cum-
berland Trust, Inc. v. EPA, 954 F.2d 1218, 1222 (6th Cir. 1992)); States Roofing Corp., 587 
F.3d at 1370 (citing Maria, 186 F.3d at 71). 
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008).
91. Id. § 2252(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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shipped or transported” jurisdictional hook.92 However, when giv-
ing effect to each word in the present version of the provision and 
presuming that different words within the statute have different 
meanings,93 § 2252(a)(2) is read as currently containing four ju-
risdictional hooks. The statute proscribes receiving or distribut-
ing child pornography: (1) “using any means or facility of inter-
state commerce;” (2) mailed, shipped, or transported “in . . . 
interstate or foreign commerce;” (3) in a manner “affecting inter-
state or foreign commerce;” or (4) containing “materials . . . 
shipped or transported” in interstate or foreign commerce.94 
Similar jurisdictional language found in § 2252(a)(4)(B) makes 
it illegal for any person to possess child pornography “that has 
been mailed, or has been shipped or transported using any means 
or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting in-
terstate or foreign commerce,” or “which was produced using ma-
terials” mailed, transported, or shipped in interstate commerce.95 
As with the other provisions of § 2252(a), courts interpreted prior 
versions of § 2252(a)(4)(B) as containing a “transported in inter-
state or foreign commerce” jurisdictional hook and a “materials 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce” jurisdictional 
hook.96 However, applying the principles of statutory interpreta-
tion discussed above to the provision reveals the statute currently 
contains four distinct jurisdictional hooks. The statute proscribes 
possessing child pornography (1) shipped or transported “using 
any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce;” (2) 
shipped or transported “in . . . interstate or foreign commerce;” (3) 
“affecting interstate or foreign commerce;” or (4) “produced using 
materials” mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate com-
merce.97 
92. See, e.g., United States v. Beltran-Hernandez, No. CR 08-0726 WHA, 2009 WL
928169, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) (emphasis omitted); see also Shannon, supra note 
61, at 88.  
93. Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 825 (quoting Lake Cumberland Trust, 954 F.2d at 1222);
Staffing Roof Corp., 587 F.3d at 1370 (citing Maria, 186 F.3d at 71). 
94. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).
95. Id. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Zimmerman, 171 F. App’x 8, 9 (9th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Adams, 343 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 
225, 227 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Bausch, 140 F.3d 739, 740–42 (8th Cir. 
1998)); United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 692, 654–55 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Zimmerman, 529 F. Supp. 2d 778, 791 n.19 (S.D. Tex. 2007). 
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
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While meticulously dissecting each provision may appear te-
dious, it is necessary to establish that § 2252(a)(1), (a)(2), and 
(a)(4) each contain a “transported or shipped in interstate or for-
eign commerce” jurisdictional hook as well as a “using any means 
or facility of interstate or foreign commerce” jurisdictional hook.98 
Given that Congress used the same language in various portions 
of the same statute, the language presumably carries the same 
meaning in each provision.99 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude 
that whatever jurisdictional reach the “using any means or facili-
ty of interstate or foreign commerce” language creates, Congress 
intended for federal prosecutors to have that reach available to 
prosecute all offenses enumerated in § 2252(a).100  
The plain meaning of the language referring to shipping or 
transporting an item in interstate or foreign commerce appears to 
require that the item involved must cross state or international 
borders during transit.101 Therefore, under this jurisdictional 
hook, the government can prosecute the alleged offense when the 
child pornography involved has crossed state or national bor-
ders.102 Were this language the only jurisdictional language in the 
various provisions discussed above, courts would be justified in 
requiring the government to adduce the sort of evidence required 
under the interstate movement approach. However, the presence 
of additional jurisdictional language evidences a congressional in-
tent to regulate child pornography operations at the intrastate 
level—namely, the “using any means or facility of interstate or 
foreign commerce” and the “affecting” language.103 
The plain meaning of the language “using any means or facility 
of interstate or foreign commerce” suggests the use of a commer-
cial means or facility that is national or international in presence 
98. Id. § 2252(a)(1)–(2), (4)(B).
99. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005) (“[I]dentical words used in differ-
ent parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have the same meaning.”). 
100. See id. 
 101. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing United 
States v. Hunt, 456 F.3d 1255, 1264–65 (10th Cir. 2006)).  
102. Id. at 1202 (“Under this framework, the plain terms of § 2252(a) convey that Con-
gress intended to punish only those who moved images or ‘materials’ across state lines 
(i.e., in interstate commerce).”).  
 103. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)–(2), (4)(B). 
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or capability.104 The statutory language does not require an inter-
state or international use of the mean or facility.105 Rather, it ap-
pears that any use will suffice.106 Therefore, the “using any means 
or facility of interstate or foreign commerce” language criminaliz-
es the intrastate transportation, receipt, distribution, or posses-
sion of child pornography if accomplished by a means or facility 
that is national or international in presence and capability, such 
as a mobile phone network.107 Given the national or international 
presence and capability of most mobile phone service carriers,108 
courts are likely to be justified in applying the per se approach 
over transportation, receipt, distribution, or possession of child 
pornography accomplished via sexting. This conclusion is bols-
tered by the fact that the insertion of the term “affecting” in the 
statute indicates a congressional intent to exercise the full extent 
of its power under the Commerce Clause.109  
 104. The language “using any facility of interstate or foreign commerce” is a clear ma-
nifestation of congressional intent that the “interstate commerce element is met whenever 
any interstate commerce facility is used . . . , regardless of whether that use was interstate 
or purely intrastate in nature.” United States v. Means, 297 F. App’x 755, 759 n.4 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (2006)); see also United States v. Giordano, 
442 F.3d 30, 39–41 (2d Cir. 2006) (interpreting a different statute with identical jurisdic-
tional language and with a similar substantive purpose). 
105. Means, 297 F. App’x at 759 n.4. 
106. Both intrastate and interstate telephone communications are part of an ag-
gregate telephonic system as a whole. And as long as the instrumentality itself 
is an integral part of an interstate system, Congress has power, when necessary 
for the protection of interstate commerce, to include intrastate activities within 
its regulatory control.  
Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 738 (10th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). 
 107. While there does not appear to be case law adopting the per se approach under § 
2252(a)’s “using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce” language, courts 
interpreting other statutes with identical jurisdictional language have reached this con-
clusion. See, e.g., United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding use of 
the Internet and phone networks to be using a mean of interstate commerce to coerce a 
child to engage in sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)); Giordano, 442 F.3d 
at 39–41 (finding the use of a phone network to transmit the name of minors for the pur-
pose of soliciting sexual activity from them to be an illegal use of a mean or facility of in-
terstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2425 (citing United States v. Perez, 414 F.3d 
302, 304 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that a national telephone network is a “facility of inter-
state . . . commerce” for purposes of the federal murder-for-hire statute))); United States v. 
Ochoa, No. 8-CR-1980, 2009 WL 3878520, at *3 (D.N.M. Nov. 12, 2009) (finding the use of 
pay phones, cell phones, and the internet to assist in kidnapping a child to be using means 
of interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006)). 
 108. Oregon Student Public Interest Research Group, Cell Phone Plans, http://www. 
ospirgstudents.org/cell-phone-plans (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
 109. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Russell v. 
United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 (1985)).  
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Therefore, the Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 
2007 (“ECPPA”) amended § 2252(a) in such a manner that the 
end of the interstate movement approach is inevitable.110 Under 
the current statutory language, jurisdiction can be sufficiently 
proved by showing that the defendant transported, received, dis-
tributed, or possessed child pornography through the use of a mo-
bile phone network.111 However, recognizing the difference be-
tween the interstate movement approach and the per se approach 
remains critical as defendants may face charges for violating the 
statute prior to these amendments taking effect.112 
VI. SPECIFIC OFFENSES IMPLICATED BY SEXTING
A.  Sexting as a Transporting/Shipping Offense 
1. Overview of Requirements
Section 2252(a)(1) is the statutory provision proscribing the af-
firmative transmission of child pornography.113 The provision ex-
pressly governs transportation of child pornography using physi-
cal or electronic means.114 A transportation of child pornography 
charge in violation of § 2252(a)(1) consists of “(1) the defendant 
knowingly transport[ing] in interstate or foreign commerce (2) a 
visual depiction of the minor (3) engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.”115 Thus, § 2252(a)(1) expressly contemplates a know-
ledge requirement and an “interstate or foreign commerce” juris-
dictional requirement as requisites for conviction of the offense.116  
110. Pub. L. 110-358, 122 Stat. 4001, 4002–03 (2008) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a) (Supp. II 2008)).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)–(2), (4)(B) (Supp. II 2008). 
 112. See, e.g., United States v. Beltran-Hernandez, No. CR 08-0726 WHA, 2009 WL 
928169, at *1–4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) (discussing defendant’s motion to dismiss in light 
of the fact that the trial would be decided on the language of § 2252(a) before the 2008 
amendments took effect). 
113. United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that § 
2252(a)(1) criminalizes shipping child pornography). 
114. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008). 
 115. Plaintiff B. v. Francis, No. 5:08-cv-79/RS-AK, 2010 WL 497375, at *4 (N.D. Fla. 
Feb. 5, 2010).  
116. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (discussing know-
ledge requirement); United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1200–01 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(discussing the burden of proof regarding § 2252(a)’s jurisdictional provisions).  
1346 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1327
In United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., the Supreme Court 
held that the term “knowingly” in § 2252(a)(1) extended not only 
to the verbs following that term (mails, transports, or ships), but 
also to the sexually explicit nature of the materials and the age of 
the children depicted.117 However, the knowledge requirement 
does not require the prosecution to show that the defendant knew 
his conduct would violate federal law.118 Rather, the government 
need only prove knowledge as to the general nature of the content 
depicted in the images.119 The knowledge requirement is not likely 
to pose a significant hurdle for the government when attempting 
to prosecute an individual for sexting. In the context of sexting, 
“transporting” or “shipping” child pornography is likely to occur 
in one of two general scenarios: (1) a minor text messages a visual 
depiction of himself or herself engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct to a romantic interest, or (2) an individual receives a text 
message containing a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sex-
ually explicit conduct and uses mobile phone technology to fur-
ther transport or ship the image.120 In each of these scenarios, the 
individual transmitting the message is usually aware of the ex-
plicit image contained in the text message and is transmitting the 
message for that very reason.121 Therefore, in most circumstances 
involving sexting, the controversy in transporting and shipping 
charges will focus on whether the jurisdictional requirement has 
been met. 
2. Jurisdictional Hooks of Transportation
Section 2252(a)(1) offers three distinct jurisdictional hooks, all 
of which focus on the specific conduct of the accused—namely, 
whether the accused transported or shipped child pornography: 
(1) using a means or facility of interstate commerce, (2) in inter-
state or foreign commerce, or (3) affecting interstate commerce.122 
117. 513 U.S. at 78. 
 118. United States v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 825 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[T]o fulfill the knowledge 
element of section 2252, a defendant simply must be aware of the general nature and cha-
racter of the material and need not know that the portrayals are illegal.”) (citing United 
States v. Moncini, 882 F.2d 401, 404 (9th Cir. 1989)); United States v. Tolczeki, 614 F. 
Supp. 1424, 1429 (N.D. Ohio 1985)).  
119. Id. 
 120. LENHART, supra note 8, at 6–7. 
 121. See id.   
122. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008). 
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Congress inserted the first jurisdictional hook into the provision 
to allow the prosecutor to prove the jurisdictional element of the 
offense in accordance with the per se approach.123 Thus, in most 
sexting cases, the government will establish jurisdiction merely 
by showing the child pornography had been transmitted by mo-
bile phone.124 
However, the per se provision did not become effective until Oc-
tober 8, 2008.125 Therefore, if the alleged offense occurred before 
that date, the prosecution will need to show the defendant trans-
ported the proscribed material by interstate or foreign commerce. 
In this situation, the primary concern for a federal prosecutor or 
defendant approaching the jurisdictional question will be whether 
the court applies the per se or the interstate movement approach 
with regard to transmissions of child pornography made via tele-
communications devices.126 A court adhering to the per se ap-
proach will find transmitting child pornography via text message 
automatically confers federal jurisdiction under § 2252(a)(1) be-
cause of the nationwide presence and capabilities of the mobile 
phone calling network.127 A court adhering to the interstate 
movement approach will look to the specific transmissions made 
by the individual and require proof that the text caused child 
pornography to travel over state boundaries.128  
B.  Sexting as a Distribution Offense 
1. Overview of Requirements
Section 2252(a)(2) is the statutory provision proscribing the af-
firmative distribution of child pornography.129 The elements of a 
123. See supra Part V.  
 124. The application of the per se approach to transporting child pornography in inter-
state or foreign commerce has been thoroughly discussed in an earlier portion of this 
comment. See discussion supra Part IV.B.   
125. ECPPA, Pub. L. 110-358, 122 Stat. 4001 (2008) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a) (Supp. II 2008)).
126. See discussion supra Part IV.A–C.  
 127. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 47 M.J. 588, 592 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1997) 
(holding that an electronic transmission of information, whether across state lines or 
across the street, via the internet is a means of transmission in interstate commerce).  
128. See, e.g., United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007) (“We do 
not read § 2252(a) as contemplating that the mere connection to the Internet would pro-
vide the interstate movement required by the statute.”). 
129. United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that § 
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distribution of child pornography charge under § 2252(a)(2) con-
sist of the defendant (1) knowingly, (2) distributing an item of 
child pornography, and (3) a sufficient nexus to interstate or for-
eign commerce.130 Thus, like the transporting offense, there is a 
knowledge requirement under the distribution statute as well as 
an “interstate or foreign commerce” jurisdictional requirement.131  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has 
held that the “knowingly” requirement pertains to both the dis-
tribution of the material through interstate commerce and the 
sexually explicit content of the material itself.132 The legislative 
history of the statute suggests that actual knowledge of the expli-
cit content is required; constructive knowledge will not suffice.133 
As with transporting or shipping child pornography, the know-
ledge requirement of the distribution charge is not likely to pose a 
significant hurdle for the government when prosecuting an indi-
vidual for sexting. This is because distribution of child pornogra-
phy through sexting is likely to occur in one of two general scena-
rios: (1) a minor text messages a visual depiction of himself or 
herself engaged in sexually explicit conduct to a romantic inter-
est, or (2) an individual receives a text message containing a vis-
ual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct and 
uses mobile phone technology to further distribute the image to 
friends, peers, or other individuals.134 In both of these scenarios, 
the individual transmitting the message is usually aware of the 
explicit image contained in the text message and is distributing 
the message because it contains that image.135 Therefore, as with 
transporting causes, controversy in sexting distribution cases will 
often center on whether the jurisdictional requirement has been 
met. 
2252(a)(2) criminalizes distributing or receiving child pornography). It is worth noting 
that § 2252(a)(2) also criminalizes knowingly duplicating child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. 
2252(a)(2) (Supp. II 2008) (criminalizing “knowingly reproduc[ing]” child pornography). 
However, this offense will not be discussed in this comment.  
 130. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2); see United States v. White, 506 F.3d 635, 641 (8th Cir. 
2007) (discussing the elements of the charge of receiving child pornography under pre-
amendment § 2252(a)(Q)).   
131. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2); see White, 506 F.3d at 641. 
132. United States v. Brown, 25 F.3d 307, 309 (6th Cir. 1994). 
133. “[T]he phrase ‘knowingly’ insures that only those sellers and distributors who are 
consciously and deliberately engaged in the marketing of child pornography . . . are subject 
to prosecution . . . .” 123 CONG. REC. S33,050 (1977) (statement of Sen. Roth).  
 134. LENHART, supra note 8, at 6–7. 
 135. Id.   
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The statute provides some guidance. Section 2252(a)(2) lists 
several methods in which the necessary nexus with interstate 
commerce may be satisfied: (1) directly distributing child porno-
graphy using a means or facility of interstate or foreign com-
merce; (2) distributing child pornography that had been previous-
ly mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce; (3) distributing child pornography affecting interstate 
or foreign commerce; or (4) distributing child pornography con-
taining materials that were mailed, shipped, or transported using 
any means of interstate or foreign commerce.136 The first two ju-
risdictional hooks have particular relevance in the context of sext-
ing and will be discussed below. However, the third and fourth 
jurisdictional hooks do not appear particularly relevant to the 
topic of sexting and will not be addressed.  
2. Jurisdictional Hooks for Distribution
The first jurisdictional hook is a congressional endorsement of 
the per se approach.137 Thus, a showing that the defendant used a 
mobile phone to distribute child pornography will sufficiently 
prove the jurisdictional requirement. However, this hook did not 
become effective until October 8, 2008.138 Therefore, if the offense 
was committed prior to that date, jurisdiction must be proved un-
der the second jurisdictional hook.  
The second jurisdictional hook focuses on the total history of 
the proscribed material—whether the distributed child pornogra-
phy has been previously transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce at any point and by any person.139 If the offense oc-
curred prior to October 8, 2008, it will be necessary to determine 
if the jurisdiction adheres to the per se approach or the interstate 
136. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Supp. II 2008).   
137. See supra Part V. 
138. ECPPA, Pub. L. 110-358, 122 Stat. 4001, 4001–03 (2008) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (Supp. II 2008)). 
 139. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (emphasis added). In light of the recent amendments to the 
statute, this jurisdictional hook may be moot in sexting cases. Logically, if the court con-
siders a transmission by mobile phone to automatically be a transmission using a means 
or facility of interstate or foreign commerce, there is no need to carry the analysis beyond 
the accused’s conduct (because her use of the mobile phone in sending the image is all that 
is needed to confer jurisdiction to prosecute that individual for distributing child porno-
graphy in violation of § 2252(a)(2)). However, this provision still has significant value in 
establishing jurisdiction for offenses committed prior to October 8, 2008 and in an inter-
state movement jurisdiction. 
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movement approach regarding mobile phone communications.140 A 
court adhering to the per se approach will find that a previous 
transmission of the child pornography via text message automati-
cally confers jurisdiction under § 2252(a)(2) because of the phone 
network’s national presence and ability to power interstate or 
foreign communication.141 A court adhering to the interstate 
movement approach will look to determine if, prior to the defen-
dant distributing the material, a communication signal transmit-
ted the child pornography across state boundaries or foreign bor-
ders.142  
Thus, even if the accused distributes the image in an intrastate 
manner, the jurisdictional hook can still be satisfied through evi-
dence that the child pornography crossed state lines at some 
 140. Compare United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1139 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding 
sufficient evidence to uphold conviction on distribution charges because the evidence dem-
onstrated that defendant transmitted proscribed images over the Internet and across state 
lines via telephone wires), with United States v. 7046 Park Vista Road, 537 F. Supp. 2d 
929, 939 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (noting that transmission of child pornography over the internet 
is sufficient to establish the jurisdictional element for a distribution charge (citing United 
States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir. 2002))).  It is worth noting that when analyz-
ing § 2252(a)(2) in the context of sexting, there does not appear to be a significant legal 
distinction between “distributing” child pornography under § 2252(a)(2) and “transporting” 
or “shipping” it under § 2252(a)(1). Compare United States v. Kirchhof, 505 F.3d 409, 411 
(6th Cir. 2007) (noting a defendant’s guilty plea for transporting child pornography under 
§ 2252(a)(1) because he distributed it over the Internet), and United States v. Smith, 20 F.
App’x 412, 415–16 (6th Cir. 2001) (describing defendant’s guilty plea to transporting child 
pornography under § 2252(a)(1) as a result of emailing it to an undercover agent), with 
United States v. Snyder, 189 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1999) (charging the defendant with 
distribution of child pornography under § 2252(a)(2) as a result of emailing the material to 
others), and United States v. 7046 Park Vista Road, 537 F. Supp. 2d 929, 939–40 (S.D. 
Ohio 2008) (holding transmission of child pornography during instant message chat ses-
sion is evidence of distribution of child pornography under § 2252(a)(2)). One possible dis-
tinction is that “distribution” under § 2252(a)(2) contemplates that the individual distri-
buting the material intends for another to view it, whereas “transportation” under § 
2252(a)(1) is targeted at an individual’s efforts to physically or electronically change the 
image’s location regardless of whether another views it. See United States v. Merrill, 578 
F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150–51 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (finding defendant did not distribute child 
pornography for sentencing purposes when he transmitted fifteen images of child porno-
graphy from his phone to his computer because there was no indication that he stored the 
images on his computer in such a way that others would view them). However, Merrill 
represents the rare situation of a defendant sexting himself. The majority of sext messages 
will likely be sent with the intention that someone else will view them, and could probably 
be categorized as “transportation” under § 2252(a)(1) or “distribution” under § 2252(a)(2). 
LENHART, supra note 8, at 6–7. 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 554 F.3d 208, 215 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that 
the jurisdictional hook of § 2252(a)(2) is met when the government shows that the images 
were received over the Internet).  
 142. See, e.g., United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that the jurisdictional element of § 2252(a)(2) requires the government to show the child 
pornography crossed state lines). 
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point, even if someone other than the accused caused the inter-
state transmission.143 In the context of sexting, this is a powerful 
jurisdictional tool in the prosecutor’s arsenal. If the government 
can present evidence that the child pornography embedded in a 
text message crossed state lines during some prior transmission 
of the message, a federal prosecutor may establish jurisdiction to 
prosecute a defendant that subsequently distributed the message, 
regardless of the particularized route that the defendant’s trans-
mission took.144 Accordingly, federal jurisdiction to prosecute an 
individual for distribution of child pornography under § 
2252(a)(2) may exist, even though the same facts do not create ju-
risdiction to prosecute the individual for transporting child por-
nography under § 2252(a)(1).145 Therefore, in seeking to establish 
jurisdiction, a prosecutor should not limit her investigation solely 
to the accused’s particularized conduct with the image in ques-
tion.146 Rather, an investigation into the chain of transmissions 
that brought the image under the accused’s control may result in 
federal jurisdiction to prosecute for distribution that would oth-
erwise not exist.147  
 143. United States v. Smith, 47 M.J. 588, 591–92 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1997) (noting 
that the “‘has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce’” language of 
§ 2252(a)(2) means that the jurisdictional hook will be satisfied “if the pornographic mate-
rials were ever shipped or transported in interstate commerce”). Smith involved a defen-
dant who had been convicted of receiving child pornography under § 2522(a)(2). Id. He had 
received the pornography via e-mail from another Marine stationed in the same state. Id. 
at 591. Smith argued that the intrastate nature in which he received the proscribed ma-
terial supported reversing his conviction on the grounds that the jurisdictional hook had 
not been satisfied. Id. at 591–92. However, the court noted that the chain of transmissions 
for that same pornography (before reaching Smith) was of an interstate nature, and this 
was sufficient to meet the jurisdictional requirement of § 2522(a)(2). Id. 
144. See id. at 591–92. 
 145. A brief hypothetical may be helpful in understanding this concept. A sends self-
produced child pornography to B via text message. During the transmission from A to B, 
the signal carrying the image crosses state lines. B receives the message and forwards it 
via text message to C. During the transmission from B to C, the signal carrying the image 
does not travel across state lines. Jurisdiction to prosecute A for transporting child porno-
graphy under § 2252(a)(1) is present, regardless of whether the jurisdiction adheres to the 
per se approach or the interstate movement approach. Jurisdiction to prosecute B for 
transporting child pornography under § 2252(a)(1) may be present, depending on if the 
jurisdiction applies a per se approach or interstate movement approach to mobile phone 
communications. Nonetheless, jurisdiction to prosecute B for distributing child pornogra-
phy under § 2252(a)(2) is clearly present, regardless of what approach the jurisdiction 
practices. This is because the image passed across state lines at some point, which is all 
that § 2252(a)(2) requires.  
146. Smith, 47 M.J. at 591–92. 
147. Id.  
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C.  Sexting as a Receipt Offense 
1. Overview of Requirements
Section 2252(a)(2) is the statutory provision proscribing the re-
ceipt of child pornography.148 The elements of a receipt of child 
pornography charge under § 2252(a)(2) consist of the defendant 
(1) knowingly, (2) receiving an item of child pornography, and (3) 
a sufficient nexus to interstate or foreign commerce.149 Receipt of 
child pornography is governed by the same statutory provision as 
distribution of child pornography.150 Therefore, a receipt offense 
carries the same knowledge requirement and interstate or foreign 
commerce jurisdictional requirement as a distribution offense.151  
Regarding the knowledge requirement of receiving child porno-
graphy under § 2252(a)(2), the government must establish that 
the recipient had actual knowledge that the message received 
contained child pornography.152 It is not sufficient to show that 
the defendant had constructive knowledge of the contents.153 
Therefore, knowingly receiving child pornography, for the pur-
poses of § 2252(a)(2), does not include the scenario of an unaware 
mobile phone owner that unexpectedly receives an image of child 
pornography via text message.154 Rather, the knowledge element 
narrows the scope of the provision to those situations more akin 
to soliciting or ordering child pornography, and receiving the por-
nography as a result of those efforts.155  
 148. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Supp. II 2008); see United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 
1069 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that § 2252(a)(2) criminalizes distributing or receiving of 
child pornography). 
 149. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2); see United States v. White, 506 F.3d 635, 641 (8th Cir. 
2007) (evaluating the statute prior to the 2008 amendments and noting that § 2252(a)(2) 
required the “defendant  to knowingly receive an item of child pornography, and the item 
to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce”); United States v. Fabiano, 169 F.3d 
1299, 1303 (10th Cir. 1999). 
150. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).  
151. Id.  
152. United States v. Brown, 25 F.3d 307, 310 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that § 2252(a)(2) 
is only intended to reach those individuals who actually knew they were receiving child 
pornography). However, specific knowledge of the actual age of the child is not required. 
Fabiano, 169 F.3d at 1303. The prosecution need only show the defendant had knowledge 
as to the “general nature” of the content. Id. 
153. Fabiano, 169 F.3d at 1303. 
 154. United States v. Colavito, 19 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. 
Osborne, 935 F.2d 32, 34 n.2 (4th Cir. 1991)).  
 155. Id.  
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Proving the recipient had knowledge that the text message 
contained child pornography will be a challenge for the prosecu-
tion because receiving child pornography through sexting is likely 
to occur in one of two general scenarios: (1) an individual receives 
self-produced child pornography from a romantic interest, or (2) 
an individual receives a text message containing a visual depic-
tion of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct simply be-
cause the sender is interested in sharing the contents of the im-
age with the recipient.156 In both of these scenarios, there is a 
possibility that the sender transmitted the message without any 
request or solicitation by the recipient.157 Therefore, a defendant 
charged with receipt of child pornography through text message 
should seek dismissal of the charge if the prosecution cannot pro-
duce evidence that the defendant knew the message would con-
tain child pornography when received.158 The prosecution should 
focus on securing evidence from which the jury could infer the de-
fendant knew that the message contained child pornography and 
received the message regardless.159 Evidence that a prosecutor 
could seek out to support this inference includes (1) previous text 
messages by the sender informing the recipient that the sender 
had the images and wanted to forward them to the recipient; (2) 
text messages by the recipient requesting the images; (3) previous 
e-mails that record such a dialogue; or (4) messages sent through 
social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, or Twitter 
that record such a dialogue.160  
The jurisdictional hook for receipt of child pornography can be 
satisfied through the exact same methods as a distribution of-
fense.161 These methods include (1) directly receiving child porno-
 156. LENHART, supra note 8, at 6–7.  
157. Id. at 7. 
 158. See United States v. Skotzke, No. 06-20475, 2007 WL 1584219, at *4 (E.D. Mich. 
May 31, 2007) (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994)) (noting 
that § 2252(a)(2) “encompasses only situations in which the defendant knows that the ma-
terial he is receiving depicts minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct”).  
 159. See, e.g., United States v. Driscoll, 852 F.2d 84, 85 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that a 
letter requesting more information about child pornography and an order for child porno-
graphy led to defendant being convicted under § 2252); United States v. Edwards, No. 92 
CR 884, 1993 WL 453461, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1993) (noting that the government sub-
mitted letters from defendant expressing interest in receiving child pornography).  
 160. In many cases, sexting is done in response to requests for the images. LENHART, 
supra note 8, at 7–8. Given the popularity of text messaging, e-mail, and social media sites 
among teenagers, it is possible they are requesting child pornography from each other 
through those mediums. Id. at 2–3; LENHART, supra note 10, at 8–9.   
 161. See 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) (Supp. II 2008). 
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graphy using a means or facility of interstate or foreign com-
merce; (2) receiving child pornography that had been previously 
mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; 
(3) receiving child pornography affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce; or (4) receiving child pornography containing mate-
rials which were mailed, shipped, or transported using any means 
of interstate or foreign commerce.162 As with a distribution of-
fense, the first two jurisdictional hooks have a significant legal 
impact in the context of sexting and will be discussed below. 
However, the third and fourth jurisdictional hooks do not seem 
particularly relevant to the topic at hand and will not be ad-
dressed.  
2. Jurisdictional Hooks for Reception
The first jurisdictional hook is a codification of the per se ap-
proach.163 Thus, showing that the defendant used a mobile phone 
network to receive child pornography will sufficiently prove the 
jurisdictional requirement of the offense. However, this hook did 
not become effective until October 8, 2008.164 Therefore, if the of-
fense was committed prior to that date, jurisdiction must be 
proved under the second jurisdictional hook.  
The second jurisdictional hook focuses on the total history of 
the proscribed material—whether the received child pornography 
has been previously transported in interstate or foreign commerce 
at any point and by any person.165 No different than a distribution 
offense, if the alleged receipt occurred prior to October 8, 2008, it 
will be necessary to determine if the jurisdiction adheres to the 
per se approach or the interstate movement approach regarding 
162. Id.  
163. See supra Part IV.B. 
164. ECPPA, Pub. L. 110-358, 122 Stat. 4001, 4001–03 (2008) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 2252 (Supp. II 2008)).  
 165. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). In light of the recent amendments to the statute, this ju-
risdictional hook may be moot in sexting cases. Logically, if the court considers receiving 
child pornography by mobile phone to automatically be receiving “using a means or facility 
of interstate or foreign commerce,” there is no need to carry the analysis beyond the ac-
cused’s conduct. However, just as with a distribution offense, this provision still has signif-
icant value in establishing jurisdiction for offenses committed prior to October 8, 2008 and 
in an interstate movement jurisdiction. 
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mobile phone communications.166 A court adhering to the per se 
approach will find that previous transmission of child pornogra-
phy via text message automatically confers jurisdiction under § 
2252(a)(2) because of the phone network’s national presence and 
ability to power interstate or foreign communication.167 A court 
adhering to the interstate movement approach will look to deter-
mine if, prior to the defendant receiving the material, a communi-
cation signal transmitted the child pornography across state 
boundaries or foreign borders.168  
Thus, even if the accused receives the image through a purely 
intrastate transmission, the jurisdictional hook can still be satis-
fied through evidence that demonstrates the child pornography 
crossed state lines during transmissions between completely un-
related parties.169 In the context of sexting, the implications of 
this jurisdictional hook are staggering. Even if the only transmis-
sion that carried a particular image of child pornography across 
state lines is the initial one, every knowing recipient of the image 
subsequent to that transmission is under the jurisdictional reach 
of § 2252(a)(2).170 Therefore, just as with a distribution charge, a 
prosecutor should not limit her investigation solely to the ac-
cused’s particularized interaction with the image in question.171 
An investigation into the chain of transmissions that brought the 
image under the accused’s control may reveal federal jurisdiction 
does exist under § 2252(a)(2), even though not readily apparent at 
initial glance.172 
 166. Compare United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding 
when an individual is charged with receiving child pornography under § 2252(a)(2), the 
government must show the process of receiving the child pornography caused the image to 
cross state lines), with United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2006) (inter-
preting an identically worded provision proscribing reception of child pornography in § 
2252A(a)(2)(B) and finding that receiving the image through the internet will automatical-
ly establish the “interstate commerce” jurisdictional hook).  
167. See MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 244. 
 168. See Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1205 (holding that § 2252(a)(2) requires a showing that 
the child pornography crossed state lines). 
 169. See United States v. Smith, 47 M.J. 588, 591–92 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1997) (hold-
ing that use of the Internet constitutes interstate commerce, regardless of the location of 
the parties involved). 
170. Id.  
171. See id. 
172. See id.  
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D.  Sexting as a Possession Offense 
1. Overview of Requirements
Section 2252(a)(4)(B) is a broad statutory provision proscribing 
the possession of child pornography.173 The elements of a posses-
sion of child pornography charge under § 2252(a)(4)(B) consist of 
the defendant (1) knowingly possessing or accessing with intent 
to view one or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video 
tapes, or other matter which contain child pornography and (2) 
having the necessary nexus to interstate commerce.174 Therefore, 
like all of the other offenses enumerated in § 2252(a), the charge 
contains both a knowledge requirement and a jurisdictional hook 
requirement.175  
“Knowingly,” under the possession offense, applies to both the 
sexually explicit nature of the conduct and the ages of persons 
depicted in the materials.176 Therefore, the prosecution has the 
burden of proving the defendant’s knowledge of both.177 Unlike 
knowledge for reception, which contemplates knowing the nature 
of the material before receiving it,178 the knowledge requirement 
for possession can be met by showing that the defendant became 
aware of the nature after viewing the image and retained it re-
gardless.179 Although there are an innumerable amount of scena-
rios in the context of sexting in which an individual could come 
into possession of child pornography, the knowledge requirement 
for possession will not pose a significant hurdle for the prosecu-
 173. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Supp. II 2008); see United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 
1065, 1069 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that § 2252(a)(4) criminalizes possession of child 
pornography). 
 174. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); see United States v. White, 506 F.3d 635, 641 (8th Cir. 
2007) (noting that § 2252(a)(4)(B) required that the defendant knowingly possess child 
pornography and that the pornography had traveled across state lines, even prior to the 
2008 amendments).   
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); White, 506 F.3d at 641.  
176. United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 2001). 
177. See id. at 380 & nn.11–12. 
178. United States v. Skotzke, No. 06-20475 2007 WL 1584219, at *4 (E.D. Mich. May 
31, 2007)  (noting that § 2252(a)(2) “encompasses only situations in which the defendant 
knows that the material he is receiving depicts minors engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct” (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994))); see also United 
States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 63–64 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Myers, 355 F.3d 
1040, 1042 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing the difference between the knowledge requirement 
of receipt under § 2252(a)(2) and possession under § 2252(a)(4))).  
 179. Myers, 355 F.3d at 1042 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B), 2252(c) (2006)). 
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tion. The government need only show the defendant received the 
message containing child pornography and did not delete it.180 The 
knowledge requirement is further simplified by the fact that the 
government need not show that the defendant had knowledge 
that the pornography or the materials used to produce it were 
transported in interstate commerce.181  
Section 2252(a)(4)(B), identifies several situations in which the 
necessary nexus with interstate commerce will be satisfied. The 
jurisdictional requirement to charge a defendant with possession 
of child pornography under § 2252(a)(4)(B) will be sufficiently 
proved if the government can show the defendant came into pos-
session of child pornography (1) transported or shipped using any 
means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce; (2) trans-
ported or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce; (3) affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce; or (4) produced using materials 
mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate commerce.182 The 
combination of the first, second, and fourth jurisdictional hooks 
makes it difficult to imagine a scenario in which jurisdiction to 
prosecute an individual in possession of child pornography sent 
via mobile phone does not exist. Given that the third jurisdiction-
al hook does not appear to be relevant in the context of most sext-
ing situations, it will not be addressed. 
2. Jurisdictional Hooks for Possession
The first jurisdictional hook inserts the per se approach into 
the provision. Thus, if the defendant is in possession of child por-
nography sent by text message, the government will be able to 
sufficiently prove the jurisdictional hook by showing a previous 
transmission of the pornography via mobile phone.183 For any al-
leged possession offense committed through sexting that occurred 
after October 8, 2008, the government will need to look no further 
 180. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 997 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting defen-
dant’s argument that he lacked the knowledge requirement for possession under § 
2252(a)(4) because he could have deleted the images from his computer and did not do so).  
181. United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 182. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); see United States v. Lewis, 554 F.3d 208, 213 n.6 (1st 
Cir. 2009) (identifying the two methods through which the jurisdictional element may be 
satisfied); United States v. Zimmerman, 171 F. App’x 8, 9 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing the 
two jurisdictional hooks of § 2252(a)(4)(B)).  
183. See supra Part V. 
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than this hook.184 However, if the alleged offense occurred prior to 
this date, the government will need to prove the jurisdictional 
element using the second or fourth jurisdictional hook.  
The second jurisdictional hook focuses on the transmission his-
tory of the image in the possession of the accused—the focus of 
the jurisdictional analysis being whether any individual previous-
ly transported the image in interstate or foreign commerce.185 
Therefore, if the date of the alleged offense is prior to October 8, 
2008, it will be necessary to determine whether the presiding ju-
risdiction applies a per se approach or an interstate movement 
approach to child pornography transmitted through mobile 
phones. A jurisdiction adopting the per se approach will automat-
ically find the jurisdictional hook has been satisfied because of 
the phone network’s national presence and ability to power inter-
state or foreign communication.186 A jurisdiction adopting the in-
terstate movement approach will require evidence demonstrating 
that the image traveled between state boundaries at some point 
in order to consider the jurisdictional hook sufficiently proved.187 
While more difficult to satisfy than their counterpart discussed 
below, the government should seek to use either the first or 
second jurisdictional hooks, if possible, because the fourth juris-
dictional hook is susceptible to “as applied” challenges.188 
 184. ECPPA, Pub. L. 110-358, 122 Stat. 4001, 4001–03 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2252 (Supp. II 2008)).  
185. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). 
 186. See Lewis, 554 F.3d at 213 n.6, 215 (interpreting § 2252(a)(4)(B)’s “transported” 
jurisdictional hook to be the same as § 2252(a)(2)’s “transported” jurisdictional hook, 
which requires only a showing that the defendant used the Internet had been used in 
transmitting the images). 
187. See United States v. Wilson, 182 F.3d 737, 744 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that § 
2252(a)(4)(B)’s “transported” jurisdictional hook requires the proscribed images to travel 
in interstate commerce and discussing how the government may produce enough evidence 
to meet this burden).  
 188. United States v, Zimmerman, 171 F. App’x 8, 9 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United 
States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the “materials” jurisdictional 
hook of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) useless, and an “as applied” challenge will prevail with-
out a showing that the particular conduct of the defendant had a substantial effect of in-
terstate commerce)). An “as applied” challenge simply means that the statute, while not 
facially unconstitutional, may be unconstitutional in its application to a particular case. 
United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 327–32 (6th Cir. 2001) (analyzing the facial constitu-
tionality of the “materials” jurisdictional hook and the constitutionality of the hook “as 
applied” to the defendant’s actions). The Tenth Circuit provides a helpful discussion on 
evidence that may be used to meet each jurisdictional hook. See Wilson, 182 F.3d at 743–
44.
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The fourth jurisdictional hook focuses on the materials used to 
“produce” the pornographic image. The jurisdictional hook is sa-
tisfied if those materials have passed through interstate or for-
eign commerce.189 Taking a picture of a minor performing sexually 
explicit conduct is considered production of child pornography 
within the meaning of the statute.190 Accordingly, film, cameras, 
and digital cameras have all been found to be materials used to 
produce photographic child pornography.191 It follows logically 
from these holdings that a mobile phone with a built-in digital 
camera could also be considered a material used to produce the 
child pornography. Therefore, if a mobile phone used to generate 
child pornography traveled in interstate or foreign commerce for 
any reason and the government can adduce evidence to that ef-
fect, the language of the statute seemingly permits prosecuting 
any individual in subsequent possession of the child pornography 
generated by that phone as a violation of § 2252(a)(4).192 However, 
courts have expressed concerns about the apparent limitless 
reach of the jurisdictional hook.193 In this regard, it is possible for 
the defendant to argue that his or her possession of the child por-
189. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Supp. II 2008). 
 190. See United States v. Chambers, 441 F.3d 438, 443, 454–55 (6th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Gann, 160 F. App’x 466, 472 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Andrews, 383 F.3d 
374, 376–77 (6th Cir. 2004). 
191. See, e.g., Chambers, 441 F.3d at 451–55 (finding that Polaroid film produced in 
either Massachusetts or the Netherlands provided sufficient interstate/foreign commerce 
nexus); United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652, 653 (1st Cir.1998) (upholding conviction 
under § 2252(a)(4) because “the fifty photographs [of child pornography] were all taken 
using a Kodak instant camera and Kodak instant film, both of which were manufactured 
by the Eastman Kodak Company outside of Massachusetts”); Andrews, 383 F.3d at 376–78 
(interpreting similar jurisdictional language of § 2251 and finding the jurisdictional re-
quirement satisfied because the defendant photographed child pornography using a pen 
camera that had traveled in interstate commerce); Gann, 160 F. App’x at 469–73 (inter-
preting similar jurisdictional language of § 2251 and finding jurisdictional hook satisfied 
when the computer used to receive and store the child pornography, the compact discs 
used to store child pornography, the video camcorder used to videotape child pornography, 
and the digital camera used to photograph child pornography were all produced outside 
the state). 
 192. See United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir.1999) (noting that the juris-
dictional element will be satisfied, as a procedural matter, in nearly every case involving 
child pornography). 
 193. Zimmerman, 171 F. App’x at 9 (citing United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 
1126 (9th Cir. 2003)) (finding the “materials” jurisdictional hook of § 2252(a)(4)(B) useless 
and that an “as applied” challenge will prevail without a showing that the particular con-
duct of the defendant had a substantial effect of interstate commerce); Rodia, 194 F.3d at 
473 (“As a practical matter, the limiting jurisdictional factor is almost useless here, since 
all but the most self-sufficient child pornographers will rely on film, cameras, or chemicals 
that traveled in interstate commerce and will therefore fall within the sweep of the sta-
tute.”). 
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nography bears so tenuous a link to interstate commerce that the 
jurisdictional hook is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of 
the particular situation.194  
VII. OTHER IMPLICATIONS
A.  Pretrial Motions  
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3) allows a criminal 
defendant to make “a motion alleging a defect in the indictment 
or information . . . .”195 Specifically, the defendant may assert that 
the indictment “fails to invoke the court’s jurisdiction . . . .”196 
Therefore, the defendant may argue that the facts, asserted by 
the prosecution in the indictment or information fail to invoke the 
court’s jurisdiction under the standards of the interstate move-
ment approach and the action must be dismissed.197 However, 
such a motion will succeed only if the defendant is being tried 
under § 2252(a) as it existed before the ECPPA.198  
There are two effective responses to such a motion. First, the 
government should highlight that Congress amended the provi-
sions of § 2252(a) to include the jurisdictional language “using 
any means or facility of interstate commerce.”199 This amendment 
could be seen as evidence that Congress always intended courts 
to interpret § 2252(a) in accordance with the per se approach and 
it simply provided statutory clarification on the point. Additional-
ly, the government can argue that the jurisdictional element in 
the provisions of § 2252(a) are intertwined with the elements de-
fining an offense. Therefore, jurisdiction is a jury issue and is 
 194. See, e.g., United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 331–32 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that 
in applying the jurisdictional hook, there must be a determination on a case-by-case basis 
about whether the activity involved in a certain case had a substantial effect on com-
merce); Rodia, 194 F.3d at 473 (finding it doubtful that § 2252(a)(4)’s jurisdictional hook 
adequately performs the function of guaranteeing that the final product regulated sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce); Robinson, 137 F.3d at 653, 654–56.  
 195. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(B). 
 196. Id. It is important to note that Rule 12(b)(3) specifically allows the defendant to 
raise the issue of jurisdiction. Id. 
197. See, e.g., United States v. Beltran-Hernandez, No. CR 08-0726 WHA, 2009 WL 
928169, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009). 
198. Pub. L. 110-358, 122 Stat. 4001, 4001–03 (2008) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252 (Supp. II 2008)). The ECPPA  became effective October 8, 2008. Id. at 4001.
 199. Id. at 4002.  
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properly challenged by a motion for judgment of acquittal after 
the government has presented its case in accordance with Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.200 
B.  Due Process  
The ECPPA amended the relevant provisions of the PCASEA 
to allow the government to establish jurisdiction by adducing evi-
dence that would satisfy the per se approach.201 Nonetheless, de-
fendants that were tried under § 2252(a) as it existed before these 
amendments took effect have a possible due process argument if 
evidence did not satisfy the jurisdictional hook of the provision in 
accordance with the interstate movement approach.202  
It is settled that Due Process requires the prosecutor to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt every element in the offense 
charged.203 The jurisdictional element is a material element for 
conviction under the provisions § 2252(a).204 Application of any 
presumption, which acts to relieve the prosecution of its burden 
to prove the jurisdictional element, is constitutionally impermiss-
ible unless certain due process protections are in place.205 There-
fore, a defendant may be able to argue that application of the per 
se approach has the impermissible impact of relieving the prose-
cution of proving a material element of the offense—namely, by 
relieving the prosecution of proving that the defendant trans-
ported, received, distributed, or possessed the proscribed image in 
or through interstate or foreign commerce.  
C.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
As a final consideration, a defendant convicted under § 2252(a) 
for an act committed before October 8, 2008 should consider ap-
pealing the conviction on the basis of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence. The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction is a 
200. United States v. Nukida, 8 F.3d 665, 673 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 201. Pub. L. 110-358, 122 Stat. 4001, 4002 (2008) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
2252 (Supp. II 2008)).  
202. The amendments took effect October 8, 2008. Id. at 4001.   
 203. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  
204. United States v. Beltran-Hernandez, No. CR 08-0726 WHA, 2009 WL 928169, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009).
205. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 n.31 (1975). 
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question of law the appellate court reviews de novo.206 However, 
the evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to the gov-
ernment.207 Nonetheless, given that the jurisdictional element is a 
material element of the offense,208 an appellant may obtain a re-
versal of a conviction if the government failed to tender evidence 
that sufficiently proved the jurisdictional hook in accordance with 
the interstate movement approach.209  
VIII. CONCLUSION
Section 2252 enables the federal government to prosecute indi-
viduals for certain crimes involving child pornography including 
(but not limited to) transporting, distributing, receiving, or pos-
sessing child pornography. To convict an individual of any of 
these offenses, the government must prove the “jurisdictional 
hook” that connects the conduct of the accused with interstate or 
foreign commerce. As electronic transmissions of child pornogra-
phy have become more prevalent, two theories have emerged on 
how electronic transmissions of child pornography interacted 
with the jurisdictional hooks: the per se approach and the inter-
state movement approach.  
With the advent of sexting among teenagers, federal prosecu-
tors will face the choice of prosecuting young adults for transport-
ing, shipping, receiving, or distributing child pornography via 
mobile phone. The current language of § 2522(a) supports appli-
cation of the per se approach and the existence of federal subject 
matter jurisdiction in almost any situation where a child porno-
graphy crime has been committed by sexting. However, the statu-
tory language that allows for the use of the per se approach did 
not become effective until October 8, 2008. Thus, if the defendant 
committed the alleged offense prior to that date, there is a strong 
argument that the prosecution must prove jurisdiction in accor-
dance with the interstate movement approach.  
206. United States v. Chavis, 461 F.3d 1201, 1207 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 207. United States v. Triana, 477 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting United 
States v. Platte, 401 F.3d 1176, 1180 (10th Cir. 2005)).  
208. Beltran-Hernandez, 2009 WL 928169, at *3. 
209. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the 
evidence presented was insufficient to sustain conviction where government did not prove 
proscribed images had crossed state lines). 
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However, the interstate movement approach has a very short 
lifespan. As the appeals for offenses committed before October 8, 
2008 grow less frequent, as well as the prosecution for more of-
fenses committed subsequent to that date, it will continue to fade 
in legal significance. Ultimately, the interstate movement ap-
proach will find its resting place in the graveyard of rejected ju-
risdictional theories, laid to rest by the ECPPA. 
And so, we return to Hiro and Peter to watch how the scene 
concludes. Hiro’s arm is outstretched and holding an evidence bag 
that contains all the proof Peter needs to establish jurisdiction—
the cheerleader’s cell phone. Peter walks over to Hiro and begins 
to reach for the bag. Then, he pauses. There is no doubt in his 
mind that he can take the bag. There is no doubt in his mind that 
he can prosecute the cheerleader. Rather, he hesitates for a dif-
ferent reason—a single doubt whispering in his mind—if he pros-
ecutes the cheerleader, will it really save the world? 
Isaac A. McBeth * 
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